Editorial

Will 2017 be the year when the European project enjoys a new lease of life, so that Europe can remain a vehicle for peace, a continent envied across the world and capable of firing its citizens’ imaginations? Will its nations muster the impetus needed to revive and develop the European project or, conversely, will there be no end to the spread of the populism, which threatens to destroy the peace and prosperity-oriented solidarity envisioned by Europe’s founders?

If there is one area where Europe’s nations should brook no delay in seeking solidarity, realising the need to pool or better coordinate their forces, in other words improve their cooperation, it is surely that of defence and security. In a geostrategic environment typified by growing tensions and renewed power struggles between States, by the radical Islamic terrorism blighting different continents and by areas of violent conflict or extreme poverty boosting the flow of migrants and refugees and destabilising entire regions, most of Europe’s nations are up against similar challenges, their citizens demanding a more suitable and better coordinated response from their political leaders.

In recent months, there have been signs of renewed dynamism in Brussels. Innovative papers have been submitted on Common Security and Defence Policy (EU global strategy highlighting the need for European strategic autonomy, Implementation document, EU-NATO road map, Commission Action Plan) and some progress achieved. In particular, at its meeting on 6 March (Joint Defence/Foreign Affairs), the EU Council decided to put the Director General of the European Union Military Staff (DG EUMS) “in command” of part of the EU’s missions (non-executive in the first instance): the corresponding military operations will henceforth be commanded from Brussels, thus setting the scene for other developments or synergies.

Further initiatives could have been expected at the European Council on 9 March, in particular with regard to the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) for which provision was made in the Treaty of Lisbon, since postponed sine die, that would enable Member States so wishing to commit to greater solidarity over defence and security. The concept of “differentiated integration” within Europe, which would parchute defence and security to the forefront of the solutions envisioned to consolidate the Union, was indeed raised at the mini-summit recently held by the French, German, Italian and Spanish Heads of State in preparation for the European Council but the qualified majority required for a Council decision remains a distant prospect.

New strategic guidelines are due to be announced in June 2017, on the basis of input expected from Mrs Mogherini’s staff and the European Commission. For its part, and in association with its partners, EuroDéfense-France has made a number of detailed proposals to support or bolster these developments so vital for Europe’s future. It can only be hoped that outcome of this year’s French and German elections will be conducive to further, perhaps even stronger, moves in this direction.

Patrick Bellouard
Major General (Engineer, retired),
President of EuroDéfense-France
Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Mitterrand, opened the symposium on “New security challenges: Rethinking European defence”. In his view, the concept of European defence was too vague. For most Europeans, and regardless of what the French might like to think, since 1945 it had essentially been the USA and NATO that had ensured Europe’s defence. He could, however, well understand the fears of all those who were uncertain about just how far the Americans would go to defend Europe. The Europeans would not be able to defend Europe on their own, even if each European country were to contribute 2% of its GDP to this end. It was not just a matter of money but also one of the principles underlying the use to be made of available funds. How could agreement be reached among the 27 States? How should they react? How should they decide? There was, however, a middle course between a European defence, as one of the mainstay of NATO, something in which Hubert Védrine did not believe, and a Europe completely passive in terms of defence. First of all, occasional alliances were possible, which could have been the case in Mali. Europe would then dispose of expeditionary forces that could carry the necessary weight in the event of a crisis. It was also possible to strengthen the industrial and technological base of our defence equipment, via cooperation or even mergers (cf. EADS). This industrial base was vital for the implementation of the strategic autonomy concept.

Strategic autonomy not only implied dispensing with the American components used to manufacture weapons but also required strategic vision. There was, however, no such vision in Europe, other than in France and in the United Kingdom. The other States were still wallowing in a sort of post-historic atmosphere where defence was a thing of the past. At the recent meeting in Bratislava, the talk had been of a “Europe that protects”, an expression used by François Mitterrand in his day. But how could this catchphrase be fleshed out? How could the Europeans be made to understand that they would need both soft and hard power to protect their lifestyles?

The Americans were not against European defence, especially for financial reasons (“sharing the burden”), but would they really be prepared to share decision-making authority within NATO? It was normal to be sceptical.

To conclude, Hubert Védrine was favourably disposed towards the proposal put forward by the Schuman Foundation. In the regrettable absence of a clear federal determination, and preferring not to await the advent of a hypothetical European defence, the Foundation had suggested the idea of a triangular agreement within NATO between Germany, the United Kingdom and France. If the United Kingdom did not wish to participate, Hubert Védrine mooted the idea of a five-party agreement involving France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden.

The next speaker, Professor Frédéric Charillon, was also conscious that all illusions of a post-tragic Europe had been shattered. In the south and east, the atmosphere was laced with menace. At the same time, European response to strategic issues such as NATO, Turkey, the Middle East, or to the issue of Russia (depending on whether the country concerned was located in the East or South) was ill-defined. Europe was currently faced with a security and defence challenge on its own territory, and not only with regard to its interventions elsewhere (“strategic third party”).

The question of European defence was further complicated by the fact that Europe was caught up in a series of financial, institutional (between the European Commission, Council and Parliament), identity, moral (refugees), and security crises.

For Frédéric Charillon, there were four challenges to be faced: the military and ground-based conflict that had not gone away, political conflict within the different institutions (UN, NATO), the battle of the social networks, and the issue of public opinion and populations.

The defence issue was crucial but Cyril Schott, Prefect, former Director of the National Institute for Advanced Studies in Security and Justice (INHESJ), also insisted on homeland security within the overall target of a "Europe that protects". He regretted that the Europeans did not always recognise the major progress already achieved as regards cooperation in this field (Europol, Frontex, European arrest warrant, etc.). He admitted that expectations continued to run high and that the migrant crisis had revealed structural weaknesses within the EU. There was a problem of equilibrium between the institutions, over the relative weight to be attached to values such as freedom and security, between the national and the supranational. These weaknesses were inherent in very nature of Europe in relation to security issues. These were areas where the cooperation rather the federal principle prevailed, as with the EGB.

What was the military background to current thinking on European defence? Edouard Guillaud, Admiral (retired) former Chief of Defence Staff, pinpointed four challenges: isolation, speed, sustainability and specialisation.

With globalisation, military isolation no longer existed whether it be in the air, on land, at sea in space or in cyberspace. Speed was of the essence but hard to achieve. In Mali, France had been able to react in the space of a single day but many European armies would not have been ready so quickly. In the case of Syria, the United Kingdom had been blocked by Westminster, and the United States by the Senate. The
Germans had to deal with the Bundestag and the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. Public opinion was another omnipresent factor, especially via the social networks, and this had an enormous effect on political decisions, especially when, for institutional reasons, such decisions were slow in emerging. As no State could act alone, it was important to make allowance for this diversity of institutional systems and for the relations between the individual States and their national public opinion. The third challenge was that of sustainability. France was capable of being the first to enter a conflict but needed regional partners to sustain the momentum. Otherwise, it would need to devote 4% rather than 2% of its GDP to its military budget. Last but not least, it was now compulsory to specialise in some types of mission and accept that absolute versatility was impossible.

Jean-Paul Paloméros, General, French Air Force (retired), former Chief of Staff of the French Air Force and former Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT/NATO), was determined to remain optimistic about the future, provided that cohesion were restored and the right decisions made. A political and strategic vision was also vital since, while pragmatism might have its positive sides, it would never galvanise people into action. From this point of view, the implications of Brexit were anything but trivial for the European defence of the future. Brexit was in fact a window of opportunity for European defence. This opinion was shared by Admiral Guillaud for whom the issue was clearly more political than military. He maintained that there could be no European defence without common strategic goals and a common vision.

Closing the first round table, Werner Fasslabend, President of EuroDefense Austria and former Austrian Minister of Defence, agreed with the insistence on vision and with the need for a quantum leap. He was deeply concerned about the situation in the East. It was not just a question of security but also one of values. Much remained to be done because, while our armies might seem sizeable on paper, in reality they fell far short of requirements.

Cyrille Schott recalled that “Europe was the miracle of peace”, a compromise between a supranational ideal and the history of very old nations. As Europe progressed from one compromise to the next, pragmatism and vision should not be seen as contradictory but should be combined. Nevertheless, he admitted that European policies had changed. Europe had gone from being a Europe of its founders (Gasperi, Spaak, Schuman) to one of believers (Kohl, Mitterrand, Giscard, Schuman) to one of shopkeepers. For him, we were living in a period of “retrenchment”, in Europe and elsewhere.

Jean-Paul Perruche, Lieutenant General (retired) former Director General of the European Union Military Staff, confirmed that the current economic and financial context, in which public funds were rare, was having an adverse effect on the issue of European defence and on the choices to be made. From this point of view, NATO offered a convenient solution but made us totally dependent on American goodwill. At the same time, events in Libya had shown that taking action within NATO without the support of the USA was very difficult. What could be the objectives? Would cooperation be permanent or sporadic? General or among the few? These questions demanded answers.

The President of the Schuman Foundation, Jean-Dominique Giuliani, considered that the concept of sovereignty needed to be redefined in relation to the new challenges facing us. The States had to juggle with national, European and international sovereignties. The old national solutions were not enough to meet all expectations. Cooperation would facilitate better application of the principle of an increasingly essential European sovereignty. Mr. Giuliani was delighted that his suggestion of a three-party intergovernmental treaty had aroused interest. This would force the major States to face up to their responsibilities. He recalled that, for him, this treaty did not mean that current projects with regard to security and European defence should be halted.

Preserving what had been attained was all the more vital in that what had been achieved was not as limited as certain people chose to claim. In his talk, Alain Le Roy, former Secretary General of the European External Action Service, listed the numerous European civil and military operations successfully undertaken in recent years. These ranged from the fight against piracy on the high seas, to human trafficking during the current migrant crisis and, still further, to the Central African Republic. For him, European cooperation over defence and security already existed and was a good illustration of the new European security strategy in these areas (cf. the document submitted by Mrs. Mogherini to the European Council last June). This document placed particular emphasis on the need to be able to intervene in the event of external crisis, reinforce our partners’ capabilities and protect Europe’s citizens. It also contained some new forward-thinking ideas on the common interest concept.

Henri Bentegeat, General, French Army (retired), former Chief of Defence Staff and former Chairman of the European Union Military Committee, was nevertheless convinced that, in Brussels, the mood had gone from optimism, if not euphoria (2006-2009), to one much more markedly pessimistic after 2010. Would Europe be capable of fighting to defend its territory and values? A number of obstacles stood in the way, not least the fact that, according to Article 5, it was up to NATO and the USA to ensure Europe’s collective defence. NATO set the norms and standards and organised collective training. The second obstacle lay in the general apathy of European public opinion. The third difficulty was Brexit. The EU was about to lose one of its two main military powers, a global vision, one of the two co-signatories of the Saint Malo agreement. The last obstacle was the “soft power” in vogue in Brussels.

General Bentegeat was nevertheless convinced that public opinion was shifting. The public was increasingly aware of the threats and dangers. Brexit had also made people more aware
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New security challenges :
Rethinking European defence

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of the weakness of our European construction. It was therefore necessary to keep working on the CSDP, irrespective of whether or not it was currently deemed insufficient, to maintain strong links with the UK over defence issues because, without the UK, projects such as the Military Staff or European Defence Agency would be unable to take shape. It was also necessary to make it easier for Europe’s armies to engage in operations and to work on the question of their joint funding, in order to arrive at the sort of comprehensive approach unfeasible within NATO (cf. Europe’s success with the Atlanta operation) and which, contrary to what certain people might like to think, did not diminish military action. More work was still needed on other fronts, naval for example, or on building up our partners’ military capacities, on pursuing or extending EU/NATO cooperation, regardless of urgency of the Turkish situation. General Bentegeat concluded by urging France to maintain its spearhead role over European defence.

Jean-François Ripoche, Brigadier General (Engineer), French Defence Technology and Procurement Agency (DGA) confirmed the importance of the European technological and industrial base highlighted by Hubert Védrine, even though he regretted the absence of a common definition. It was, therefore, necessary to adopt a didactic approach for the future, in particular by making it clearly understood that the defence market was different to other markets, since its clients were the States and not private-sector players, unlike the security market for example. It was also essential to make people aware that the armed forces represented a long-term investment with repercussions for the issue of strategic autonomy. In normative terms, it was crucial to defend the notion of “giving preference to Europe” as the “idea of a specific European defence market” in Brussels. While the Americans were our partners within NATO, they were our rivals with regard to exports. Conversely, we could cooperate over cross-functional technologies, including among European competitors.

Admiral Païtard (retired), representative of the MBDA group, quoted his company as being a practical industrial example of the situations previously described. In his view, the concept of strategic autonomy was good news for the European defence industry. However, it was important to ensure that the issue of Franco-British defence did not become a hostage of general negotiations over Brexit, the bilateral relationship between the two countries being essential. There were several examples of European champions that had emerged from this cooperation and a number of other developments in the pipeline, such as missiles, were vital for the future of both European defence and our arms industry.

Care must also be taken to ensure that cooperation between the Germans and the British did not gain ascendency in the event of political confrontations, since this would bring American military equipment into the equation. Under German leadership, military developments would essentially remain within NATO and the individual States would be prevented from reaching their critical mass. France would be isolated in the face of a German-British tandem, which would play a decisive role within NATO. For Admiral Païtard, there was one further danger, namely that of the opposition between the Commission and the Council over these issues. Taken together, these dangers could substantially undermine the concept of strategic autonomy.

In closing the second round table, Dr. Antonio Figuereido Lopes, President of EuroDefense-Portugal and former Portuguese National Defence Minister, insisted on the importance of the signals to be transmitted by governments in a context marked by a resurgence of populism, extremism and nationalism. European defence was not an option but a necessity, even if a balance had to be struck between freedom and security.

Patrick Bellouard, Major General (Engineer, retired), former Director of OCCAR, and President of EuroDefense-France, concluded the symposium by highlighting the progress made and the opportunities now existing to improve Europe’s defence thanks to the new European security strategy submitted by Mrs. Mogherini to the European Council last June, and its concept of European strategic autonomy. Finally, he thanked all speakers for the quality of their contributions.

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1 MBDA group: European missile system developer and manufacturer
2 OCCAR: Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation
The third edition of the Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa was held in Dakar on 5 and 6 December 2016. This forum, unique of its kind in Africa, was first staged in December 2014, and followed on from the 2013 Elysée Summit. The purpose was to set up an innovative annual international event, bringing together all those concerned by security in Africa and its relationship with international security. It was the third such event and it is general agreed that the forum is getting stronger and more focused each year. Indeed, recommendations from earlier editions have already formed the basis for both African and international initiatives targeting peace and security in Africa.

This latest forum was remarkable for the extensive participation of officials not only from Africa, the UN, Europe, and France, but also from Japan and China. With its very full and lively programme, it was the opportunity to examine the issues forming the backbone of the forum’s activity: extension of the terrorist threat, peacekeeping issues, African efforts to adapt and consolidate defence and security force capacities. In keeping with the aim of the Forum, which seeks to address the root causes of African crises and the means to respond to them, new topics were also discussed, such as the fight against radicalisation and doctrinal responses to violent extremism, environmental and humanitarian threats, the private sector’s contribution to peace.

The opening session was a key highlight of the forum, as it encapsulated the different issues, debates and prospects developed during the event.

Together with Senegalese President Macky SALL, the following keynote speakers took the floor:

- Hervé LADSOUS, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the UN,
- Shunsuke TAKEI, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in Japan,
- Jean-Yves LE DRIAN, French Minister of Defence,
- Federica MOGHERINI, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The Senegalese President emphasised the extent to which interests were interdependent, making the point that the security challenges facing Africa were the same as those facing the rest of the world, with no country being exempt. He insisted on the need to have properly trained, well-drilled defence and security forces to ward off terrorism in all its forms. Indeed, during its recent stint as President of the UN Security Council, Senegal had started discussions on peacekeeping operations and their adaptation to asymmetrical threats, since, in his view, conventional peacekeeping operations were no longer effective. He also underlined the efforts undertaken to make the African Standby Force operational, and the need for good working partnerships. In this connection, he highlighted the progress made with cooperation between the UN and the African Union (Resolution 2320 of 2016).

Macky Sall was convinced that security on its own was not the answer, asserting, for example, that cooperation over border controls should be accompanied by efforts to monitor financial flows and internet networks, and by legal assistance. The President had an original and constructive approach to radicalisation. While he did not underestimate the efforts to be made with regard to educating, training, and providing employment for young people to protect them from the social exclusion that was a breeding ground for violent extremism, he emphasised that poor education and poverty were not the only reasons for the drift towards extremism. Otherwise, why were there well-educated young people from privileged backgrounds among the extremists?

For Macky Sall, the fight against radicalisation should involve spiritual education and training to deconstruct all the rhetoric and manipulation of consciousness to which the young were the most susceptible. More specifically, he was truly convinced that it was by cultivating the individual’s moral and spiritual resilience that it would be possible to erect the strongest bastions against violent extremism. This approach to the fundamentals of jihadist extremism by the President of a predominantly Muslim country (95% of the population), practising an open and tolerant form of Islam, was particularly interesting at a time when many countries were questioning their policies in this regard.
Hervé Ladsous pointed out that 9 of the 16 UN peacekeeping operations concerned Africa, in other words 2/3rds of the uniformed personnel involved in these operations. Two main points stood out from his analysis: the need to consolidate and modernise Africa’s armies and the importance of regional and sub-regional cooperation. Consequently, the emphasis placed by the Ivory Coast and Guinea on the reform of the security sector was considered essential to the stabilisation of these countries. Well-chosen new technologies such as drones could be a cheaper option for helping to improve surveillance methods. Intelligence represented a priority for which the synergy between human and technological resources needed to be exploited.

Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter underlined the role of the regional organisations. It was in this spirit that the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) were working on sharing the funding of the African Union’s peacekeeping operations. The AU had demonstrated its ability to deploy its forces with alacrity, it then being up to the UN to take charge at a later stage. The Sahel G5 was facing major challenges in a crucial part of the world, which called for close cooperation in each of the following key domains: intelligence, border protection, the army, the police. Maritime security in West Africa represented another challenge for the future. This was an area where it was necessary to be capable of anticipation in order to establish the necessary cooperation and develop common capacities. Prevention certainly came at a price but this price was significantly lower that of the operations that would be needed if prevention were to fail.

Finally, the legal aspects of these operations were not to be underestimated, since it was this factor that could stamp out the feeling of impunity that still existed.

The Japanese representative confirmed his country’s commitment to supporting African development. He emphasised the success of the 6th international conference in Tokyo. He insisted on the support given to the training of 10 million people, occupational training in 50,000 cases. The JAPAN-FRANCE partnership for Africa was a promising line of cooperation that could only improve the efficiency of the support given to African countries over peace and security. In addition, the Japanese representative did not fail to mention the reform of the Security Council “in order to right a historical injustice”.

The French Minister of Defence expressed his satisfaction that a forum to which he had largely contributed since its creation and which he had described as vital continued to exist and was proving useful. His remarks were logically set against a combined political and operational backdrop. The threat of terrorism was obviously central to his concerns. He emphasised that terrorist organisations developed and spread primarily by exploiting the weaknesses of the States and its consequences for their populations: poverty, underdevelopment, hopelessness and lack of prospects in societies caught up in the maelstrom of demographic growth. However, there should be no mistake; terrorist groups were, above all, driven by the desire to seize power by means other than political. They disputed the legitimacy of the States as a means of taking control of their land and resources, and of enslaving their populations. It was also necessary to fight extremists on the ideological front, a hotbed of radicalisation, and for this cooperation with the countries concerned was essential.

Exerting control on the ground and managing resources were further key issues. Terrorist groups had no respect for borders, witness the example of Boko Haram, which operated in four different countries. Response to this type of cross-border threat could only be multinational. This was the objective not only of the Sahel G5 but also of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the fight against Boko Haram. France fully supported these different actions, whether through the Operation Barkhane and the action conducted from Dakar by French forces in Senegal or as part of efforts to step up regional maritime security.

For a consistent and coordinated response to current and future threats, Africa’s changing security challenges must be taken into account. Hybrid threats required new strategies. The African forces would have to be ready to embark on a whole range of different operations, for the most part asymmetrical. For this, thorough training and suitably-adapted equipment would be necessary, which underlined the importance of the efforts made by France and the EU in this regard.

For Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative, a first-time participant at the Forum, the concept of “sustainable security” needed to be further developed. While it was naturally crucial to resolve the serious crises raging in Africa, we should also be aware that failure to tackle the problems at their roots had, in the past, resulted on numerous occasions in a resurgence of conflicts thought to have been resolved. Whence the idea of “sustainable security”. To quote from her address “we must prevent crises before they explode. We must create antibodies, resilience within African society, the ability to channel tensions towards non-violent solutions. We must therefore encourage positive African voices to speak up, and there are more of these than many people might think. Africa is
a young continent, half of its population being under the age of 30, and we must therefore invest in the extraordinary human capital that is African youth. It is an incredible reserve of energy, innovation ideas. Throughout Africa, a real thirst for change is palpable, a desire for democratic transition, as in Gambia recently, is emerging among the people. There is no development without security, and there is no security without development. The EU is steadfastly committed to those intertwined issues and carrying out 6 executive military operations and training and guidance missions on the African continent. In order for these actions to reach their full potential, the EU is focusing on cooperation between civil and military operations. The EU has also been a long-time supporter of the consolidation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, and has allotted more than 2 billion euros to that cause since 2004.

The EU is investing in cooperation for development through 60 tangible projects in more than 20 countries, that aim to reform civil institutions, police and army, to strengthen civil protection and implement border controls and maritime surveillance. The main goal is to promote sustainable security. It is important to also highlight the significant efforts made by the EU and its member states in terms of promoting development in Africa, a cause in which they invest 20 billion euros per year."

Among the many speeches delivered during this Forum on Peace and Security in Africa, particular mention should be made of that of the Special Representative of the Chinese Government for African Affairs, Xu Jinghu. Speaking in perfect French, she insisted on the importance for her country of cooperating with Africa in a spirit of peace and development. Accordingly, China was promoting a new concept of common integrated, participative and sustainable security. For the Chinese representative, the international community should treat Africa as an equal, respecting and supporting the efforts of African countries to set up collective security mechanisms and solve Africa’s problems using African solutions instead of imposing its will on African nations or meddling in their domestic affairs. Xu Jinghu also highlighted her country's commitment to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, with China having provided the largest number of peacekeepers among the five permanent members of the Security Council, and making second highest contribution to the funding of African peacekeeping operations. To conclude, she reasserted her country's commitment to supporting the long-term peaceful development of Africa.

The closing session of the Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa was the natural conclusion to this particularly productive event.

The Presidents of Senegal, Nigeria, Cape Verde, the Vice-President of Libya, the Prime Ministers of Togo and Mali, and the French Minister of Defence, were all present on this occasion.

The Nigerian President was reassuring about his country's ability to stamp out Boko Haram's efforts to control the North-eastern part of his country, but he also emphasised the growing activity of terrorist groups based in the South connected with the trafficking of stolen oil. He praised the effectiveness of cooperation among Lake Chad Basin Commission countries (Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, Benin) in mobilising troops and police forces in large numbers while associating Niger in their efforts. He underlined the role played by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram for bringing long-term stability to the region.

He concluded by identifying unemployment as the main problem of his country, a country with 180 million inhabitants, 65% of whom were under 35 years of age. However, he was convinced that it would be possible to rise to this challenge by exploiting the natural resources of his country and its agriculture.

The Prime Minister of Mali underlined how well the Algiers agreement signed with a number of rebel movements was working. He was highly insistent on the absolute need for all parties as a body to focus on the root causes of the crisis besetting his country, the existence of groups operational throughout the Sahel, the huge flows of money that had enabled them to acquire impressive resources, and the vast human reserves, youngsters in particular, on whom they could call to replenish their troops.

The Libyan Vice-President highlighted the successful fight conducted by the Tripoli government against ISIS at Sirte. This was a major if not a final step in the combat against terrorism. He asked not only all neighbouring countries but also France to help Libya in this combat and in rebuilding the country.

The final speaker was the French Minister of Defence, who echoed the comments of Mali's Prime Minister, in emphasising that the trio formed by security, development and democracy was both an objective and a condition for ensuring the stability of countries in difficulty. In this connection, he quoted the example of the Central African Republic. He also underlined the need for African countries to make efforts with the help of their partners to improve their security and to establish sufficiently robust forces to guarantee their sovereignty. He concluded by expressing satisfaction that, at this 3rd Forum for Peace and Security in Africa, the issue of radicalism had for the first time been addressed both frankly and openly by the various speakers, regardless of their origins and faith. On this point, he made special mention of the President of Senegal, the Vice-President of Libya, the Al-Azhar University in Cairo and the Moroccan and Senegalese universities. In his words: "It is the Muslim countries that must own this form of Islam, the respectable form, in order to ward off all forms of radicalism or fanaticism".

Jean-Paul Paloméros
General (retired)
Former Chief of Staff of the French Air Force
Former Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT/NATO)
Board member of EuroDéfense-France
It was the vessel that capsized on 18 April 2015 with 700 migrants on board that prompted the EU to decide to set up a naval force to prevent such trafficking in human lives. EUNAVFOR MED, also known as Operation SOPHIA, was launched on 18 May 2015. The operation is designed not so much to halt the flow of migrants but rather to create disruption in the routes and resources used by the people smugglers.

The operation comprised three phases (see footnote 2).

Operation SOPHIA operates in a zone extending from Libya's western border, for the moment outside the country's territorial waters, to the North of Tobruk, excluding Greek coordination and rescue zones. An operational base has been set up in Rome under the command of Italian Rear-Admiral Enrico CREDENDINO backed by a 70-strong staff of naval officers from different European countries on board the Italian aircraft carrier CAVOUR under the orders of Rear-Admiral Andrea GUEGLIO. EUNAVFOR MED reached full operational capacity on 27 July 2015.

Background

According to FRONTEX, 929,171 migrants succeeded in crossing the Mediterranean to Europe in 2014. 83% of them went via the eastern route, 16% via the central route and less than 1% via Gibraltar. Of the 154,725 migrants who took the Central Mediterranean route, 91% sailed from Libya and 8% from Egypt. The vast majority of shipwrecks occur in the “Lampedusa triangle” to boats sailing out of the ports of Zuwarah and Misrata, mostly at between 20 to 40 nautical miles beyond Libyan territorial waters.

West of Tripoli most of the boats are wooden vessels. More to the East, rubber dinghies account for two-thirds of all traffic, despite being smaller and therefore less profitable. For traffickers whose vessels are captured under Operation SOPHIA, their seizure represents a total financial loss. The wooden vessels are either fishermen’s boats or boats imported from Tunisia or Egypt.

Although Operation SOPHIA involves monitoring sources of supply, results to date have been far from convincing. The rubber dinghies apparently come from China and would seem to be imported on cargo ships transiting via Malta or Turkey, a theory borne out by the recent discovery, by the Maltese customs, of about 20 hulls bound for Misrata. The shipment was however allowed to continue to its final destination, there being no legal procedures to enable their interception.

1 Name given to a baby girl born on 22 August 2015 on board a German frigate to a mother rescued from a migrant ship

2 Article 2 – Mandate

1. EUNAVFOR MED shall operate in accordance with the political, strategic and politico-military objectives set out in the Crisis Management Concept approved by the Council on 18 May 2015.
2. EUNAVFOR MED shall be conducted in sequential phases, and in accordance with the requirements of international law. EUNAVFOR MED shall:
   (a) in a first phase, support the detection and monitoring of migration networks through information gathering and patrolling on the high seas in accordance with international law,
   (b) in a second phase,
      i conduct boarding, search, seizure and diversion on the high seas of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, under the conditions provided for by applicable international law, including UNCLOS and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants;
      ii in accordance with any applicable UN Security Council Resolution or consent by the coastal State concerned, conduct boarding, search, seizure and diversion, on the high seas or in the territorial and internal waters of that State, of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, under the conditions set out in the Resolution or consent;
   (c) in a third phase, in accordance with any applicable UN Security Council Resolution or consent by the coastal State concerned, take all necessary measures against a vessel and related assets, including through disposing of them or rendering them inoperable, which are suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, in the territory of that State, under the conditions set out in that Resolution or consent.
distress signal. Since they had only meagre supplies of food and water and not enough fuel to go more than 40 nautical miles from the shore, the SOS was not long in coming. This scenario was the first, so-called “non-escorted”, solution.

Over the next six months, the traffickers further reduced the amounts of fuel and food on board and dispatched the vessels in harsher weather conditions.

The second modus operandi involved escorting the boats, a change of tactic probably prompted by infiltrating among traffickers, to prevent “their” migrants from being subjected to further extortion by rival operators. This technique has since been replaced by a third solution, namely “territorial escort”, in other words escorting the vessels for as long as they remain within the territorial waters.

For those departing from Egypt, the most plausible scenario is that of using mother ships, usually fishing vessels, that pick up the migrants on the coast, and then either take them across or cast them off on smaller boats out at sea. No evidence of this modus operandi has been seen since the last six weeks of 2015.

Human trafficking is basically motivated by financial considerations. People-smuggling will remain with us, as long as there is money to be made. The day this ceases to be the case, the practice will start to fade. The smugglers’ number one concern is to not be caught. As long as SOPHIA cannot intervene within territorial waters, they have little to fear. But if and when SOPHIA is allowed to operate in these waters, the risks they face will escalate.

**Modus operandi**

Three frigates and the aircraft carrier CAVOUR together with their helicopters, plus a maritime surveillance aircraft were used for the first phase. Operations consisted of observing the routes followed and the tactics deployed from the departure points of Zuwarah, Sabratha, Garabulli and Misrata. 3,078 migrants were rescued during this phase and highly valuable information gathered, in particular regarding the different routes used to reach Libya.

This information proved useful in preparing for CONOPS phase 2. While the OPLAN makes no difference between Phases A and B, a distinction of this type was made by the European Council in its decision. The OPLAN agreed on 28 September signaled the start of Phase 2A on 7 October (on the high seas). This involved reinforcing the naval force: nine surface ships, one submarine, three surveillance aircrafts, five helicopters and a drone. By the end of October, 8,336 migrants had been rescued and 67 ships destroyed. In December, 46 people smugglers were handed over to the Italian authorities.

At the end of 2015, Admiral GUEGLIO announced that Phase 2 could begin, provided the political and legal conditions were established to authorize access to Libyan territorial waters. He was, therefore, waiting for new Council instructions and for the agreement of the PSC (Political and Security Committee).

**An operation not without its critics**

A report issued by the UK House of Lords, published on 13 May 2016, was rather damning with regard to Operation SOPHIA. To quote from this report: “[...], however valuable as a search and rescue mission, [it] does not, and we argue, cannot, deliver its mandate. It responds to symptoms, not causes.”

The UK report was critical of Phase 1 of SOPHIA as regards its intelligence gathering capacity, deemed highly unproductive. It also criticized Phase 2A, judging the number of smuggler arrests minor and lacking in real impact, largely because of the impossibility of taking them to court. However, it acknowledged that destroying vessels has been a step forward. But there was a general feeling, in the end, that SOPHIA was actually doing the smugglers’ job for them.

The UK announced that it has granted €10 million in aid to the new Libyan Government under Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj, 1.5 million of which was to fight against migrant trafficking and organized crime. But for the moment, Al-Sarraj does not have the support of the Islamic factions in Tripoli nor that of General Haftar in Tobruk. Added to which, this issue is unlikely to be top priority for the new government.

**The need for cooperation**

At the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in Rome, the Italian Navy receives representatives of the Italian coastguards and EUROPOL. OHQ exchanges information with FRONTEX, INTERPOL and the 22 participating States. Naturally, this cooperation also extends to the Italian national operation “Mare Sicuro”, which comprises five ships deployed off the coast of Libya and resources – between one to six vessels a day – provided by the NGOs.

To stamp out human trafficking operations, suspects need to be brought before the courts and a robust legal framework is therefore required to carry out this part of the mandate. The Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Palermo Protocols offer the requisite legal basis, further underpinned by the Resolution of the United Nations Security Council. In his report, Admiral GUEGLIO underlined the high standard of cooperation with the DNAA (Direzione Nazionale Antimafia ed Antiterrorismo = National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Directorate) in Italy and FRONTEX.

**SHADE MED**

Using a similar approach to the one established for Atalanta, a Shared Awareness and Deconfliction initiative has been established for SOPHIA (SHARE-MED). Its purpose is to coordinate the different actions of the operations in the Mediterranean – TRITON and POSEIDON (FRONTEX), SOPHIA (CSDP), MARE SICURO (IT), ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR and SNMG 2 in the Aegean (NATO) and EU LPC Tunis (CSDP civ.). A first meeting was held in Rome on 25 November 2015. An agreement was signed with FRONTEX as well as SOP (Standard Operating Procedures) with EUROJUST and a MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) with EUROPOL.

A second SHADE MED forum was held on 12-13 May 2016 in Rome, at Operation SOPHIA’s OHQ with 145 participants from 34 nations and 75 organizations, including representatives from UN, EU and NATO. All the attendees complained about the inadequate resources allocated to their task. Also highlighted were the proliferation of operational networks and the lack of links between them.
Three proposals were formulated for submission to the United Nations: 1) The need to reinforce the Libyan arms embargo in addition to Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 2095 (2013). 2) The advisability of extending the embargo to inflatable boats and outboard engines to cut off the people smugglers’ supply chain. 3) The urgency of declaring the central Mediterranean zone a Humanitarian Aid Area.

For the actual traffickers, there is no solution, since human trafficking is not classed as an international crime, which makes the International Criminal Court powerless to intervene.

In the end, the measure with the greatest support was that of attacking the traffickers via their logistics supply chain. A meeting with representatives of the Libyan coastguard was held in November in Tunis but attended by representatives from Tripoli only. There is a vital need for a newly re-established efficient and properly equipped Libyan coastguard, able to protect the country’s maritime borders, to enable the international community to withdraw from the scene. Help in coastguard capacity building and joint exercises could be used as bargaining power in exchange for an agreement on the part of the Libyan authorities to authorise temporary deployment of ships in its waters as part of Operation SOPHIA in a joint operation for the duration of Phase 3. This explains why Admiral GUEGLIO suggested amending the OPLAN to add capacity building and training of the Libyan coastguard and navy to EUNAVFOR MED’s assignments.

**23 May 2016 meeting of the European Council**

Following the meeting in Vienna on 23 May 2016, the European Council decided to extend the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED by one year and to add two further tasks:

- building capacity and training the Libyan coastguard and navy, and sharing information, as and when requested the legitimate Libyan authorities;
- contributing to information sharing and to enforcing the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya on the basis of a new United Nations Security Council resolution.

The Council placed emphasis on the importance of continued coordination between SOPHIA and the UN and NATO.

After one year of operations, a strategic review is now underway at military HQ, to allow for developments in the region. Possible solutions include:

- extending the area of operations to the east of the present area, to include other migratory routes and mesh with the FRONTEX zone in the Aegean;
- preparing for phase 2B, so that action can start as soon as the political green light has been obtained, by making preparations for training the Libyan coastguard and navy,
- contributing to the country’s stability by targeting the terrorist and criminal organisations’ maritime logistics supply chains.

Through its Defence Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, France has declared its readiness to take part in this operation.

**NATO**

In February 2016, at the joint request of Germany, Greece and Turkey, NATO deployed Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG-2) in the Aegean in the fight against the people smugglers.

At the end of a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Brussels on 19 May 2016, John Kerry announced that NATO had agreed to broaden its operations in the Mediterranean to help the European Union stop illegal migration. One solution could be to transform Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR into a non-Article 5 Maritime Security Operation.

There could therefore be two operations off the coast of Libya: SOPHIA, in charge of building capacity and training Libyan military personnel in the country’s territorial waters, and the NATO force, deployed offshore to discourage and ward off possible attacks. This is what can be deduced from an answer given by Federica MOGHERINI at a joint press conference with NATO Secretary General, Jens STOLTENBERG, on 20 May 2016: “Obviously, as we move to potential additional tasks of the operation, such as the training of the coastguards of Libya or the potential work on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution on the arms embargo, we would need also to strengthen our assets and our capacities and the support and the cooperation with NATO in this respect could be essential.”

At the Warsaw Summit, held on 8-9 July 2016, NATO decided to support Operation SOPHIA by providing ships and drones. “We have transitioned Operation Active Endeavour, our Article 5 maritime operation in the Mediterranean, which has contributed to the fight against terrorism, to a non-Article 5 Maritime Security Operation, Operation Sea Guardian, able to perform the full range of Maritime Security Operation tasks, as needed.” and “We have agreed, in principle, on a possible NATO role in the Central Mediterranean, to complement and/or, upon European Union request, support, as appropriate, the EU's Operation Sophia through the provision of a range of capabilities including Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and logistics support; through contributions to capacity building of the Libyan coastguard and navy, if requested by the legitimate Libyan authorities and/or the EU; and in the context of the implementation of UNSCR 2292 on the situation in Libya, in close coordination with the EU.

The report made during the Ministers of Defence's informal meeting in Malta (May 2017) states that SOPHIA has saved 35,037 lives at sea, arrested 109 smugglers and disabled 422 smuggling boats. Libyan Navy and Coast Guard's training is proceeding successfully unless some reports from NGOs (SOS Méditerranée) related ambiguous behaviour with migrants³.

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¹ The last sentence is an update provided by the author, reflecting SOPHIA’s actual results. They were obviously not available when the article was first published in October 2016.
The global strategy for EU foreign and security policy put before the Member States by Federica Mogherini at the end of June 2016 to a warm reception repeatedly insists on the need for European autonomy. This new vision has paved the way for proposals from the European Commission, not least the Communication of 30 November 2016, greeted with satisfaction by the European Council on 15 December 2016, which outlined the measures for funding the security and defence Research and Development (R&D) required to achieve this autonomy, together with the defence Research and Technology (R&T) plan. This latter, currently in the drafting stages, cannot suffice on its own to reach this autonomy target. All these developments signaled the demise of a long-standing taboo which had previously prevented the European Commission from tackling issues connected with defence. The European Council asked Mrs Mogherini and the Commission to expand and further elaborate on their proposals in the next few months with a view to rapid implementation.

Why is European funding needed for defence R&D?

As envisioned, moves towards a defence R&T programme, in other words with a sum earmarked in the 9th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FPRTD 2021-2027) for defence sector research, would only produce new technologies in around 2027 at best. Even then, no new defence equipment would be available. In reality, new equipment is produced through development programmes (the D in R&D) rather than through R&T and these can take from seven to ten years to come to fruition: the earliest that defence equipment based solely on technologies emerging from the European R&T defence plan would be 2035 at best. None of the individual States has an arms industry spontaneously funded by private investment. This is easily understandable in view of the huge cost and high risk nature of the investment required for R&D (up to 20 to 30% of turnover), since the domestic and export markets are both totally unpredictable. As a result, defence equipment is only developed when commissioned and funded by the customer State. R&D funding of this type is only included in the budget when States are determined to be strategically autonomous, for political reasons and to enable independent use of the equipment concerned.

Furthermore, in recent years the EU Member States, most of which prefer to take cover behind the Americans for their security, have been constantly reducing overall their efforts over defence, to extent that they are now on average below the 2% NATO target to which the European Council alluded in its 15 December 2016 conclusions. The consequence of this is the sorry shortages of capacity in Europe highlighted by recent operations, which prevent European countries from providing a response to the new risks facing them and from taking independent action. None of the European countries is today in a position to act alone. Collectively they can recover a measure of strategic autonomy, if they are prepared to spend more on defence and, above all, if they are ready to work together more closely and increase the amounts invested in common defence:

• either as part of multilateral cooperation programmes (at the moment, only 8 to 9 billion euros of a total annual budget of approximately 50 billion are actually invested in defence cooperation programmes, in other words less than 20%). Moreover, this percentage has remained the same for more than ten years, contrary to the 35% target set by the European countries in November 2007),

• or in connection with major projects entirely funded from the EU budget (cf. the European programme Galileo).

An international environment conducive to European cooperation

Two major events that occurred in 2016 should, in their different ways, spur the Europeans into strengthening their bonds and working more closely together, especially over defence and security.

Firstly, the British vote in favour of Brexit, admittedly fostered by a campaign of disinformation about the EU and its workings, has nevertheless clearly shown the extent to which electors are uneasy with European structures, the purpose and strategy of which they do not understand. Restoring a dynamic and compelling vision of Europe and recreating a wave of solidarity are a matter of urgent necessity, especially in relation to security and defence where the concept of solidarity can really come into its own. Failing that, what happened in the UK could happen elsewhere, even if it is still too soon to predict the ultimate outcome and the real consequences of this vote.

Secondly, the unexpected election of Donald Trump to the White House could well cause upheaval in the international order of recent decades. Hardly had he taken office but Donald Trump was already making his first decisions in line with his campaign promises and is patently unembarrassed by the
many criticisms prompted by these decisions in the United States and worldwide. His declarations about NATO, about Brexit, for which he is full of praise, and generally about security and foreign policy, should prove a strong incentive for Europeans to strengthen their bonds in order to achieve strategic autonomy in a highly uncertain world, where Europe can no longer rely on the support of its main ally.

**How could the EU finance a defence equipment programme?**

At all events, the EU’s aim would not be to take over the roles or responsibilities of the Member States, but rather to encourage them to cooperate in order to fill the gaps in their capacities and reinforce European autonomy, including in the industrial sector. The EU could intervene in a variety of ways depending on the capacity requirements identified. Any funding will need to be distributed in the easiest and most flexible possible way.

If there are capability requirements likely to concern all EU Member States, along similar lines to Galileo (telecommunications or satellite observing systems, radar or drone-based surveillance systems, or even strategic modes of transport being potential examples), it would be appropriate for them to be funded from the EU budget. The EU would then own the equipment delivered (cf. Galileo) which would be at the disposal of the Member States (under conditions to be established). Project management (including signature of the corresponding contract(s)) could be entrusted to an existing competent body, such as OCCAR (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation) which, since 2012, has had an agreement with the European Defence Agency and a security agreement with the EU, under the supervision of bodies to be specified in each case.

If a limited number of Member States were concerned by the particular capability requirement, in which case project funding would normally be their collective responsibility, the EU could step in to facilitate or encourage cooperation, the main issue then to be overcome before launching a cooperation programme being the need to ensure agreement over the availability of funds and common timelines. EU intervention could take several different forms:

- partial funding through European credits (in the EU budget itself) for co-developments already launched or to be launched: the EU would then indeed be contributing to cooperation programmes undertaken at the instigation of EU Member States and recognised as contributing to the European autonomy strategy;

- loans to States willing to participate in a cooperation programme but not having the required budget capacity at the time of programme inception (for example, States whose capability requirements are less urgent than those of their partners): these loans could come either from a revolving fund set up beforehand by the States (EDA proposal), or from the EIB provided that this latter be vested with the authority to fund defence projects.

This type of support from the EU could have been useful at the start of the A400M programme. It could also be decisive for future programmes such as the MALE drone programme currently in preparation.

**Conclusion**

Europe’s need for autonomy, which is a feature of the global strategy for European Union foreign policy and security tabled by Federica Mogherini, has been acknowledged by the European Council. It is important now to waste no time in implementing the measures needed to achieve this goal, the urgency being heightened by growing uncertainties over the international situation.

On the basis of the proposals put to the European Council by the Commission on 15 December 2016, new momentum should be injected into investment in cooperative defence efforts in Europe by giving the EU the authority not only to establish a defence R&T programme (EDRP) but also to finance new European programmes (of similar type to Galileo) or to support defence R&D programmes undertaken via cooperation among Member States (with the same target of autonomy). This support could take the form of subsidies (co-funding) or loans (to the States).

Lastly, all this action should be taken within the framework of existing treaties, using all the possibilities that these afford, not least the Permanent Structured Cooperation for which provision is made in the Lisbon Treaty and counting on the support of competent bodies already established, such as EDA\(^1\) or OCCAR\(^2\).

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\(^1\) EDA: European Defence Agency

\(^2\) OCCAR: Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation

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